Jan 21, 2026 Bill BrattonCorporate Law
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock,
The Cleansing Effect of Shareholder Approval in a World of Common Ownership, available at
SSRN (Nov. 18, 2024).
It’s been ten years since MFW and Corwin opened a process pathway to business judgment review of cashout mergers, subject to Weinberger, and arm’s length mergers, subject to Revlon. At the time the cases came down, I anticipated smooth sailing for the cases’ two-track cleansing regime, under which the defendant needs independent director approval followed by ratification by a fully informed and uncoerced majority of disinterested shareholders. I figured that we had enough law in place on each of the tracks to make their application a straightforward matter. The components of the board approval leg, director independence and a special committee process, were focal point matters in late twentieth-century corporate governance, and there were plenty of Delaware cases providing guidance. The shareholder approval leg had a sketchier background. We had a well-developed law, mostly federal, on the full information requirement, and we knew coercion when we saw it. We had much less on the table to help us with precise questions respecting majority disinterested shareholder approval, because shareholder ratification had not theretofore been the usual practice recourse respecting conflicted transactions. But how hard could it be to fill in the details?
It turned out to be a lot harder than I thought. MFW and Corwin came down before everybody’s attention turned to the Big Three institutional investors and their growing block of voting shares and the closely related question of portfolio investor incentives, in particular the incentives of “common owners.” Common owner conflicts first popped up on the screen in 2004 with the empty voting allegations triggered by the Mylan-King merger agreement. The problem has been looming larger ever since, implicating not just corporate governance but antitrust. Continue reading "Institutional Disinterest"
Jan 20, 2026 Nancy KimContracts
Brett Frischmann and Moshe Y. Vardi’s article, Better Digital Contracts with Prosocial Friction-in-Design, wrestles with perhaps the most vexing problem facing contract law today – what to do about the proliferation of digital contracts that infest our screens. Frischmann and Vardi tackle the problem from a different angle than most contracts scholars (perhaps not surprising given their background and expertise in technology). Rather than focusing exclusively on doctrinal or legislative solutions, they propose design-based solutions that reframe and reconceptualize assent (and consent).
Their article begins with a critique of digital contracting (while they use the term “digital contracting”, they are mostly concerned with wrap contracts, such as clickwraps and browsewraps, and not DocuSign-type documents). The failure of digital contracting as an aspirational ideal has to do with digital contracting systems, which they define as “the combination of law and code-based architecture that generates boilerplate.” (P. 4.) These systems fail not simply as implementation of the traditional model of contracts (two parties bargaining and reaching mutual assent or a “meeting of the minds”), but more tragically for humanity, they “generate contracting behavior and contractual relationships that are as far from the ideal as one can imagine.” (P. 4.) Continue reading "Slowing Down the Clicks"
Jan 19, 2026 Lorianne Updike SchulzkeConstitutional Law
The Founding was for Whites. Or so it would seem, according to most contemporary histories or legal accounts of the era. Black Writers of the Founding Era, edited by Jim Basker and Nicole Seary, adds important color to that history. This edited volume is the most comprehensive compilation of Black-authored editorials, letters, court petitions, sermons, and poems to date, and the first such compilation of Black writings during the Founding in over 50 years.
Very few Black men and women at the Founding were literate. Whereas 90% of the white population was literate in 1790, roughly 90% of the Black population at the Founding were enslaved, and a very small percentage of the entire Black population (5-10%) was literate. In two states—South Carolina and Georgia—teaching an enslaved person to read and write was illegal. The few extant Black writings have been difficult to find, or out of print. The paucity of Black writings from the Framing has inevitably led to their absence in historical and legal accounts. As a result, it has been assumed that the Founding was not for them: the Constitution was not theirs, and the Revolution was fought only for those they served ala. In part, this has led many to conclude, ala Justice Thurgood Marshall’s famous Bicentennial speech, that “We the People” excluded Black Americans and turn to alternative narratives of American history like the 1619 Project. Continue reading "Adding Color to the Founding"
Jan 16, 2026 Edward RubinAdministrative Law
Donald Trump has placed the issue of the President’s removal power before the Supreme Court, and its answer will undoubtedly be one of its most important decisions in the entire field of administrative law. Independent agencies, where leadership is appointed by the President with Senate approval and can only be removed for cause, have been a mainstay of our modern administrative state since its development in the late nineteenth century. The first modern agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was structured in this manner, and the model has been regularly employed for many others, including the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities Exchange Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board.
Although prediction is a notoriously difficult enterprise, current indications are that the Court will accede to Trump’s argument (sometimes described as the unitary executive theory) that the President has inherent power to remove most, or all, executive officials and that the many enacted provisions limiting him to removal for cause are unconstitutional. This will reverse a century of Supreme Court doctrine; indeed, except for some expansive language in Chief Justice Taft’s 1926 decision in Myers v. U.S. (whose actual holding is the uncontroversial principle that Congress may not participate in the removal process), the Court has never questioned the constitutional validity of independent agencies. In decisions such as Seila Law v. CFPB and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCOAB, it struck down the use of for cause provisions to create innovative agency structures, but it left the basic principle – as articulated in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S. and revised in Morrison v. Olson — intact. The pragmatic consequences that will flow from reversing this long-established doctrine will be unfortunate at best. Donald Trump has demonstrated hostility to democratic governance and the rule of law, not merely by statements and behaviors reported by the press, but through actions repeatedly struck down by federal courts. In other words, his troubling pattern of political and legal irresponsibility can be discerned from the legal record that falls within the Court’s institutional purview. To grant him the power to ignore the limits that have accompanied Congressional grants of authority for one hundred fifty years and exercise sole control of the entire administrative apparatus is to court disaster. Continue reading "How to Avoid Trumping the Legal History of Removal"
Jan 15, 2026 Anne Marie LofasoWork Law
As I often remind my students, labor law stands among the most demanding courses in law school—not just for its intellectual rigor, but for the layered complexity it presents. Labor law is rooted in a dense statutory framework. It requires mastery of intersecting doctrines from constitutional, administrative, and contract law, all of which are interpreted through a case-heavy lens.
At its core, labor law grapples with deeply human issues—power dynamics, structural inequities, and the lived realities of working people. Its scope is wide and constantly in flux, shaped by the shifting politics of Board leadership and the broader currents of social change. But what makes it so compelling—so urgent—is that it is never abstract. It is relentlessly real. It forces us to grapple with clashing perspectives from workers, employers, and unions, each bringing their own lived experience and competing visions of fairness, autonomy, and justice. Continue reading "Can You Hear Section 7 Now?"
Jan 14, 2026 David HortonTrusts & Estates
When I read the premise of Mark Glover’s terrific new article Nominal Bequests—that some small-dollar gifts are problematic—I couldn’t help wonder whether it was a kind of stunt, like writing a novel without using the letter “e.” What could be wrong with testamentary gifts of trivial sums? Even if these bequests were somehow harmful, wouldn’t the payoff from regulating them pale in comparison to the costs? But Glover (who has been publishing up a storm) is waiting in the weeds with creative and thoughtful answers.
For starters, Glover argues that “[s]ome nominal bequests . . . are wasteful” and “undermine the fundamental policies of the law of succession.” He astutely observes that testators invariably make nominal bequests for one of two reasons. First, some are motivated by spite. Glover offers the real-life example of a mother who left each of her four daughters $1 and quips that she “wanted to give [them] something worse than nothing.” Second, Glover notes, other testators are laboring under a mistake of law. They want to disinherit the beneficiary entirely, but they incorrectly believe that they must acknowledge the individual to prevent a court from deeming the individual to be accidentally omitted. Either way, Glover contends, there’s no social value in implementing these testators’ wishes. Freedom of disposition supposedly encourages industry and thrift, but “[t]he donor has no reason to increase her wealth during life to functionally disinherit the beneficiary at death.” Continue reading "Small Gifts, Big Problems"
Jan 13, 2026 Gregory KeatingTorts
In an illuminating article, A Novel Tort Duty for Platforms that Intermediately Produce Real World User Interactions, Jordan Wallace-Wolf proposes that we recognize that a distinctive duty of care should attach to internet platforms that “cultivate” markets. Ridesharing Apps— Uber and Lyft— are the paradigm platforms that he has in mind. Professor Wallace-Wolf’s perceptive proposal warrants careful consideration. It puts its finger on properties of the interactions that platforms promote that courts and other commentators have not identified as clearly. And its proposed liability rule responds to those properties in an attractive, justified way. Continue reading "Sponsoring Torts: Reconceptualizing Platform Liability"
Jan 12, 2026 Samy AyoubLegal History
Mohammad Fadel’s Beyond Liberal Zionism, is an extraordinary work of legal and moral imagination. Fadel reframes one of the most enduring and polarizing questions in international law: what would a just Zionism look like? In his answer, Fadel insists that international law and political liberalism, properly understood, retain the moral and institutional resources to guide Israelis and Palestinians toward a just settlement.
The article opens with an assessment of liberal Zionism. Fadel argues that what is commonly called liberal Zionism recognizes Palestinian suffering but denies Palestinians standing as rights-bearers. This position is exemplified by New York Times commentator Ezra Klein and by the late Israeli legal theorist Ruth Gavison. The goal of liberal Zionism is a humane peace, not a just one. This distinction—between a moral appeal to compassion and a juridical claim to equality—animates Fadel’s entire article. Through a careful reading of Klein’s widely discussed, post-October 7 podcast series on the Israel–Palestine conflict, Fadel shows how even the most self-consciously liberal commentators confine Palestinian aspirations to a humanitarian vocabulary of aid, decency, and empathy. The effect is to transform a problem of law and justice into a problem of sentiment. Palestinians appear as objects of moral concern rather than subjects of legal right. Continue reading "Equality Before Law: Just Zionism, Political Liberalism, and the Question of Palestine"
Jan 9, 2026 Ignacio CofoneTechnology Law
Julie Cohen’s Oligarchy, State, and Cryptopia is a bracing account of how a handful of technology companies can move beyond regulatory arbitrage to something more ambitious: remaking the rules by which they are governed. The article’s core claim is that some groups of tech elites do more than evade oversight: they reconfigure the administrative state to relocate meaningful rulemaking into private hands.
Cohen’s analysis clarifies a particular form of power and why several familiar toolkits in the law, such as antitrust, fail at addressing it. From the many explanations that emerge from Cohen’s comprehensive framework, three are worth noting. Today’s tech elites fit the description of oligarchs not because they are rich, but because they can use their wealth for infrastructures that enable them to produce private rules (including both self-regulation and private governance) insulated from democratic accountability. So, programs of AI governance should consider political economy because the firms that build and operate the infrastructure also shape the State that might regulate them. An extension of this idea is that privacy law’s traditional focus on individual consent misses the point because the risk that privacy law should be addressing is the structural concentration of informational power. Continue reading "Tech Elites Don’t Just Evade the State, They Change It"
Jan 8, 2026 Sarah SchindlerProperty
In her recent essay, Slum Managers, Professor Anika Singh Lemar interrogates the distinction between ownership and management of rental housing. Numerous legal commentators and legislators have focused on the harms associated with large commercial entities purchasing rental housing, and some have even proposed prohibiting or placing limits on certain types of ownership to address the housing affordability crisis. However, fewer lawmakers and scholars have discussed who manages these properties. Professor Lemar investigates whether management might have an even greater impact on rental housing and its tenants than ownership.
Property management often has more to do with the actual lived experience of a tenant than the property’s ownership. Indeed, it is generally the management company that is responsible for making repairs, ensuring safety, collecting rent, and carrying out evictions. As Lemar points out, small owners can also be or employ bad managers. Thus, Lemar’s thesis is that lawmakers and others interested in tenants’ rights should be pushing for laws and policies that focus more on harmful management practices and less on forms of ownership. Continue reading "Let’s Focus on Property Managers Rather than the Form of Ownership"
