Feb 28, 2025 David HoffmanContracts
Erik Encarnacion,
Section 1981 as Contract Law, available at
SSRN (Jan. 10, 2025).
Erik Encarnacion’s Section 1981 as Contract Law presents a striking claim: 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a statute primarily understood as a piece of federal antidiscrimination law, is, in fact, a foundational component of contract law in the United States. Section 1981, originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and later amended in 1991, prohibits racial discrimination in the making, performance, modification, termination, and enforcement of contracts. Encarnacion argues that this provision does not merely sit adjacent to contract law as a regulatory constraint; rather, it is an intrinsic part of contract law itself. This conceptual reframing has significant implications for legal theory, doctrinal teaching, and the broader understanding of how contract law operates on the ground, and I recommend the paper to you.
Encarnacion’s thesis rests on two primary claims. First, he makes a conceptual argument that Section 1981 should be recognized as part of contract law because it directly governs the formation, enforcement, and modification of contracts. He traces its origins to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which sought to dismantle the Black Codes—state laws that restricted the contractual and economic freedoms of newly freed Black Americans. These laws imposed additional formal requirements on Black contract formation, often nullifying their economic agency. The 1866 Act, therefore, was as much a reconstitution of contract law as it was a civil rights measure. Continue reading "Contract Law’s Hidden Civil Rights Foundation"
Feb 27, 2025 Bill BrattonCorporate Law
Corporate governance and corporate finance operate very differently as legal academic topics. With governance, there’s always some new legal development—a Delaware ruling, a provision in a corporate code, or a new SEC regulation. Failing that, the international corporate governance machine is a reliable generator of new material, whether a new wrinkle on a monitoring process or a substantive initiative falling inside the big tent of corporate purpose. With finance, law and legal theory are more in the back seat while practice takes the lead. Bankruptcy is the one important exception, but even there, practice has been trumping law in recent years as bankruptcy courts have passively turned the reins over to controlling creditors. Not that there aren’t developments in the practice to write about. There are. But this will be more a matter of tracking new wrinkles than accounting for great upheavals.
It is, accordingly, a big deal for legal finance when a whole new mode of financing springs up on the upper part of the right side of corporate balance sheets. The quick rise of private credit in recent years is just such a development. Jared A. Ellias and Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Credit Markets Go Dark, 134 Yale Law Journal 779 (2025), lays out the territory with diligence, clarity, and sophistication. Continue reading "Private Credit"
Feb 26, 2025 Mila SohoniAdministrative Law
Since the Supreme Court overturned Chevron in Loper Bright, the administrative law community has been consumed with the question of what will come next—and how much it will differ from what has gone before. Some predict that deference by courts to agencies will persist, albeit in renamed or reconceptualized form. Some worry that the combination of Loper Bright with other cases decided last term will empower courts to kneecap regulatory schemes, both old and new. Others posit that agencies will turn to regulatory tools that bypass whatever pitfalls may emerge as a consequence of Loper Bright and its brethren.
As scholars and policymakers grappled with the past term’s implications for federal agency power, Professor Adam Zimmerman’s Ghostwriting Federalism arrived to remind us that the reach of administrative influence extends far beyond the realms of formal rulemaking and judicial deference. This rich and thought-provoking new article is about much more than the post-Loper Bright world. The paper points out a great number of routes — fifty, to be precise — that agencies might use to promote policy objectives even in a world of federal courts inhospitable to federal regulatory power. Continue reading "Re-Routing Power"
Feb 25, 2025 Henry L. Chambers, Jr.Work Law
Dave Hall and Brad Areheart have written an article that anyone who cares about employment discrimination and workplace bias should read. In it, they propose to amend Title VII to provide that “when a worker makes a prima facie showing that she is a member of a protected class and has experienced a bad outcome at work, that showing should trigger a rebuttable presumption that the defendant-employer unlawfully discriminated against the worker.” To rebut that presumption, the defendant-employer would have to show “by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse outcome was solely job related for the position in question.” (P. 777-78.) Even if Congress is unlikely to amend Title VII, the authors’ proposal should start a serious discussion about whether and how to address an article of faith, that the courts’ current interpretation of Title VII does not hold liable as many employers for employment discrimination as it should.
At just under 40 pages, the article is an easy read. It provides a good outline of the problem it proposes to solve. Many employers escape Title VII liability for instances of workplace discrimination because of Title VII’s narrow focus on intentional discrimination, a proof structure that tends to search for specific animus-based instances of discrimination. In addition, federal judges tend to see less discrimination than jurors. The authors note that even though much less overt animus exists in society and in the workplace than in the past, substantial employment discrimination manifests through lingering animus, apathy, implicit bias, and structural bias that may be unrecognized. Continue reading "Providing a Bold New Solution to an Old and Growing Problem"
Feb 24, 2025 Victoria J. HanemanTrusts & Estates
Would you rather have government decisions made by artificial intelligence or by a presidential administration that you loath? The concept of the villainous AI overlord became part of the zeitgeist with the Terminator movie franchise, but the reality is that the greatest threat to the future of humanity may be itself. AI decision-making has demonstrated remarkable reliability and efficiency, often outperforming human decision-making in various domains. The ability of AI to quickly process immense amounts of data, identify patterns, and make decisions based on objective analysis minimizes the impact of biases and emotions that can cloud human judgement. As AI technology continues to progress, there is a growing possibility that AI may eventually displace humans in governing and decision-making positions. It is estimated that AI may soon replace 300 million jobs, or 9.1% of jobs worldwide. Jobs with a higher level of exposure to AI tend to be in higher paying fields, where education and critical reasoning skills are required. Prof. Lee-ford Tritt’s article, The Use of AI-Based Technologies in Arbitrating Trust Disputes, considers whether it is appropriate or feasible to supplant or support human decision-making with AI technology in the context of trust litigation.
This is less science fiction and more science fact, as China has already started to use AI-based courts to resolve legal disputes. The central question undergirding Prof. Tritt’s examination is the degree to which the experience of being human should control or guide dispute resolution. AI has several possible applications to arbitration, generally. It may assist arbitrators in the performance of their job, with tasks such as case management and fact gathering. AI may also assist with decision-making. One study demonstrated that artificial intelligence is able to predict the vote of individual Supreme Court justices with more than 70% accuracy, which far exceeds the reliability of human predictions. AI is less accurate with predictions involving factually similar cases, which may mean either that AI is less likely to identify legal nuances or that human factfinders are inconsistent in the application of the law. If the latter, we may find that AI decision-making is more equitable because of the precision with which the technology applies the law. We may also find that running our decisions through AI to ensure the fairness of the decision is a useful and supportive tool. Continue reading "Artificial Intelligence as Arbitrator"
Feb 21, 2025 Gregory KeatingTorts
Adam Slavny’s Wrongs, Harms, and Compensation: Paying for Our Mistakes rejects a basic premise of most contemporary tort theory. It renounces all aspiration to interpretive adequacy and holds contemporary tort law up to rigorous philosophical scrutiny. The results are invariably stimulating, usually illuminating, and often persuasive.
Most contemporary tort theory tries to show that the theory being propounded makes sense of tort law. Economic analysis, for example, can be, and sometimes is, presented as merely a positive account of the law of torts—as a demonstration that “common law legal rules are, in fact, efficient.” This positive claim can be distinguished from the normative claim “that common law legal rules ought to be efficient.” Sometimes economic theorists of tort do renounce all claims to normativity and insist that their views are purely positive. And sometimes they do the reverse: they renounce all interest in making sense of the law that we have and declare themselves interested only in the law as it should be. More often than not, though, economic theorists of tort are read to claim that tort law both is and should be efficient. Continue reading "Can Tort Theory be Foundationalist?"
Feb 20, 2025 Melissa MortazaviLegal Profession
“Civil lawsuits—especially class actions and multidistrict litigation (MDL)—can be messy and complicated,” (P. 49) Professor Seth Endo begins his lucid article, Ethical Guardrails to Unbounded Procedure, which is anything but messy and provides a deceptively simple solution to a complicated area of law. Here, Professor Endo sinks his teeth into the question of how judges should approach areas of civil procedure where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provide little guidance, biting off a meaty chunk of the beast that is the wild west of MDL complex litigation as his primary illustrative example. His solution? To give teeth to a body of legal authorities already in existence and largely previously ratified by the courts: that of professional-conduct rules.
Professor Endo sets his target on “common-benefit” fees, specific fees afforded to a subset of lawyers in MDL who are members of plaintiffs’ steering committees (PSC), to compensate them for litigation coordination. These fees spring from a void left in procedural rules and statutes. These fees are highly controversial, both for affording attorneys’ fees that are disproportionately high compared to plaintiffs’ recovery and because the composition of MDL leadership positions has often been under representative of both the demographic composition of the bar and the plaintiffs. As an example, Professor Endo highlights the Propulsid litigation against Johnson & Johnson where common benefit fees amounted to approximately twenty-seven million dollars in contrast to plaintiffs’ recovery at under seven million dollars. (P. 52.) In that case, the seven member PSC was entirely composed of white men despite a “disproportionately large percentage” of the plaintiffs being female. (P. 53.) These types of facts, coupled with the courts’ underutilization of traditional forms of lawyer sanctioning in MDL cases, gives the damning impression that courts use these fee structures and lucrative appointments at best to control and manipulate lawyer conduct to privilege expediency and out of court resolution of claims, and at worst to fall prey to bias and reward powerful lawyers at the expense of injured clients and less well-connected attorneys. Continue reading "Seeing the Unseen: Procedural Solutions in Plain Sight"
Feb 19, 2025 Howard M. WassermanCourts Law
Paul Schiff Berman,
The Future of Jurisdiction, 102
Wash. U. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2025), available at
SSRN (Mar. 22, 2024).
Personal jurisdiction sits in a state of flux. A decade-and-a-half of renewed Supreme Court engagement—with another case on the way this Term—has changed some things, failed to clarify longstanding uncertainty, and sowed new confusion. The originalist turn has reached personal jurisdiction, with arguments for returning to our jurisdictional origins.
Paul Schiff Berman predicts The Future of Jurisdiction. He places the current era in an historic evolution of American society and jurisdictional doctrine and revises jurisdictional rules to better fit the needs and reality of the 21st century. He offers four key insights a about personal jurisdiction; those insights lay the foundation for his new approach. Continue reading "A New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction"
Feb 18, 2025 Andrea BoyackProperty
Ezra Rosser,
Progress and the Taking of Indigenous Land, 85
Ohio St. L.J. __ (forthcoming, 2024), available at
BePress (Jan. 1, 2024).
Property is both “freedom” and “theft.” Takings jurisprudence in the United States evokes both these paradigms, sometimes justifying and sometimes condemning the exercise of eminent domain. For example, in the now-infamous 2005 case of Kelo v. City of New London, a divided Supreme Court barely upheld a government taking of a home to promote economic development. Twenty years prior, a unanimous Supreme Court easily upheld a government taking of Hawai’ian land for economic purposes in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. Interestingly, although widespread public outrage in response to the taking of Suzette Kelo’s “little pink house” has raged since 2005, the taking upheld in Midkiff continues to be shrugged off as economically justified. Why the difference?
Professor Ezra Rosser’s forthcoming article, Progress and the Taking of Indigenous Land, reframes the United States Supreme Court 1984 holding in Midkiff to better explore the property tensions in takings law by placing the case in its broader context. Although the Courts opinion speaks in terms of market competition, the taking at issue pertained to land (‘āina) held by and for the benefit of native Hawai’ians. Rosser’s reconsideration of Midkiff importantly re-situates the case—and takings law in general—within the long and troubling history of indigenous property dispossession in the United States. Continue reading "‘Āina Lost: Modern Justifications for Native Property Theft"
Feb 17, 2025 Betsy FisherLexImmigration
When is a citizen stateless? This is not a children’s joke with a clever punchline; living with an entitlement to but without recognition as a citizen is the lived experience of untold numbers of people globally. It is also a matter of scholarly debate: are such individuals, entitled to nationality but unrecognized by their state, stateless? Or are they merely de facto stateless? Some have argued that such individuals are stateless, and that the term de facto statelessness is unhelpful. These scholars can point to the international definition of statelessness as someone ‘not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.’ The argument goes, if someone is entitled to nationality, but not considered as a national, they are stateless, full stop. Others point to the 1954 Convention’s failure to protect de facto stateless people as proof of its inadequacy to protect people without state protection.
Ghost Citizens joins this conversation, noting Prof. Jamie Chai Yun Liew’s view ‘that the legal fact of being conferred citizenship is important. As such, persons should be considered stateless until they are legally recognized as a citizen.’ But her monograph pushes further, arguing that we must also explore why the state determines who is a citizen to start with. Here, she joins the theoretical contributions arguing that genuine links to a state should establish a stateless person’s claim to citizenship. Continue reading "Stateless Citizens and State Authority"
