What History Really Says About the New Article II Assault on Private Enforcement

Nitisha Baronia, Jared Lucky, & Diego A. Zambrano, Private Enforcement at the Founding and Article II, 114 Calif. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2026), available at SSRN (May 8, 2024).

If we were on Family Feud and the question was “Name a constitutional obstacle to private enforcement of federal substantive law,” the #1 answer on the board would probably be Article III standing—most notably its requirement that any plaintiff suing in federal court must have suffered a concrete, particularized “injury in fact” as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. After TransUnion v. Ramirez, however, a new answer is moving up the survey: Article II. Although most of TransUnion’s rationale was grounded in Article III, Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion also observed that private litigation by ostensibly “unharmed” plaintiffs “would infringe on the Executive Branch’s Article II authority.” TransUnion’s invocation of Article II has accelerated challenges to a host of federal private enforcement regimes, prompting one district court judge in Florida to declare the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act unconstitutional.

In their excellent article, Nitisha Baronia, Jared Lucky, and Diego Zambrano interrogate this Article II challenge to private enforcement by taking us back in history. Long before Richard Dawson was hosting Family Feud. All the way back to Richard Harrison, the Auditor of the U.S. Treasury Department whose correspondence with Alexander Hamilton sheds light on Founding Era understandings of private enforcement regimes. Baronia, Lucky, and Zambrano marshal a host of historical sources to show that the new weaponization of Article II stands in stark contrast to a “tradition of private enforcement” that existed before, during, and immediately following the Founding. In an age when “history and tradition” dominate so much of the legal landscape, this is an invaluable contribution. Continue reading "What History Really Says About the New Article II Assault on Private Enforcement"

A Legitimation Crisis Strikes Delaware Corporate Law

Ann Lipton, The Legitimation of Shareholder Primacy__ J. Corp. L. __ (forthcoming, 2025), available at SSRN (Feb. 03, 2025).

The United States is going through a moment of extreme political strife and uncertainty. Delaware’s corporate law ecosystem is going through its own moment of strife and uncertainty, albeit with less stratospheric—but still high—stakes. Significant connections exist between the conflict occurring within these two systems, including but not limited to the techno-king himself, Elon Musk.

Ann Lipton explores some of those connections in The Legitimation of Shareholder Primacy. Lipton argues that the central corporate law norm of shareholder primacy was intended to shield Delaware law from political debate, but internal tensions within the concept combined with the political polarization of our times have battered that shield. The development of that argument features Lipton’s deep knowledge of corporate law and governance, which is tied here to an interesting political story. Continue reading "A Legitimation Crisis Strikes Delaware Corporate Law"

Contracts in The Digital Age

Andrew Keane Woods, The New Social Contracts, 77 Vand. L. Rev. 1831 (2024).

A fascinating new article by Andrew Keane Woods examines contracts in the digital age. These contracts are society-wide in scope, and their scale surpasses other massive contracts we use. Moreover, they set the rules for digital society and govern the digital world. Furthermore, they determine constitutional rights such as privacy rights, speech rights and Fourth Amendment rights.

The internet, digital platforms, and social media are heavily governed by private law. However, courts generally apply contract law to enforce these contracts without due regard for their public aspects, as outlined above. Courts emphasize procedural fairness and assent rather than substantive justice and the contract’s social impact. Furthermore, courts usually allow parties to contract away their public rights, such as the right to sue in a court of law, and regularly enforce liability waivers. Moreover, courts commonly overlook the public interests, social costs, and harms these contracts entail, and only rarely invalidate contracts on grounds of public policy. Similarly, scholars and reformers mainly focus on procedural fairness and mutual assent, for example by promoting better disclosure, while neglecting the public aspects of these contracts. Continue reading "Contracts in The Digital Age"

State Constitutions As A Bulwark Against Oligarchy

Lucien Ferguson, Contesting State Capture, 46 Cardozo L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2025), available at SSRN (Feb, 6, 2025).

What is the proper role for courts to play in ensuring the health of our democracy? In the early 21st century, the principal threat to democracy is state capture by monied interests and what appears to be a rising oligarchic state. At a time when the president of the United States uses the South Lawn of the White House to record an ad for a car company owned by a billionaire who has donated hundreds of millions of dollars to his campaign, concern about state capture by special interests is one of this country’s most urgent problems. The federal courts have been called upon to police illegal and unconstitutional activity, placing a strain on our judicial system that threatens our democracy. However, they have proven unwilling to address the murkier problem of state capture by powerful and wealthy individuals who use the government to promote their own interests.

In his forthcoming article, Contesting State Capture, Lucien Ferguson shifts our focus from federal to state courts. Ferguson argues that state courts have a special role to play in preventing state capture, in part because state constitutions contain special provisions aimed at preventing this peril. According to Ferguson, some of the most urgent examples of capture include partisan gerrymandering and voter ID laws, which are all designed to aid one political party (the Republican Party), as well as Right to Work Acts that undermine the political power of unions. Ferguson maintains that these laws are “special acts” that violate state constitutions and common law doctrines. One can also think of examples that cut towards the Democratic Party, such as legislation that favors union organizing and plaintiff’s attorneys, significant sources of funding for Democratic candidates. Ferguson calls on state courts to enforce state constitutional provisions to constrain state capture from any source. Continue reading "State Constitutions As A Bulwark Against Oligarchy"

The “Phantom Public” Exposed and Transformed

Nikhil Menezes & David Pozen, Looking for the Public in Public Law, _U. Chi. L. Rev._ (forthcoming, 2025), available at SSRN (Oct. 02, 2024).

If you have ever advocated for a greater “public” role in administrative law without specifying who that public actually is or how they might realistically engage, then Nikhil Menezes’ and David Pozen’s terrific new article, Looking for the Public, is a must-read. Menezes and Pozen call out our bad habits, trace the many adverse consequences that result from our imprecision, and challenge us to do better while offering concrete suggestions for how we might do so. Their analysis makes it clear that until we address the phantom public problem, well-meaning efforts to create more inclusive or public-spirited policies and processes will be missing the most critical ingredient of all—evidence that the policies or processes actually benefit a “credible public.”

Looking for the Public begins by tracing how, despite our reliance on the public as the lodestar for virtually every policy and process in administrative law, lawmakers and scholars regularly appeal to the public without providing evidence-based accounts of who the public is or how they might engage. Efforts to ground policy or accountability mechanisms in “public opinion,” the “public interest,” and “public participation” often neglect to locate these same publics, while at the same time steadfastly ignoring mounting literature that suggests the public is absent or not credibly represented. Continue reading "The “Phantom Public” Exposed and Transformed"

Antidiscrimination Law Cannot Accommodate Asymmetry

William R. Corbett Reasonably Accommodating Employment Discrimination Law, 128 Penn. State L. Rev. 535 (2024).

In a field as volatile and fragmented as employment discrimination law, it helps to see how courts take the same concept in different statutes and apply that concept against different backdrops. In Reasonably Accommodating Employment Discrimination Law, Professor William Corbett has done just that by examining “reasonable accommodation” in federal employment discrimination law as a mandate, an entitlement, and a capacious concept. He focuses on the employer duties under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (enacted 1990, amended 2008) to provide “reasonable accommodations” to employees and job applicants for “known physical or mental limitations” absent “undue hardship on the operation of the business”; the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (enacted in 2022), which requires employers to make “reasonable accommodations” for an employee for “known limitations” related to pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions absent “undue hardship on the operation of the business”; and the employer’s duty under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended) to “reasonably accommodate” current and prospective employees’ religious practices absent “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Corbett finds that these accommodation duties “demonstrate the largely dysfunctional, piecemeal approach that Congress and the Supreme Court have followed for over half a century in revising and updating employment discrimination law.” (P. 539.) His insights throughout the article and his use of the lens of comparison make the piece exceptional.

Corbett sharply and thoroughly excavates the problem from Supreme Court opinions like Groff v. DeJoy (2023), EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch (2015), and Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2015). First, according to Corbett, the Court approaches the statute at issue to engage in statutory interpretation. Next, Congress responds to the decision by amending the statute at issue or otherwise changing the decision’s result with a “patch.” At this point, the Court sets about interpreting the new statutory language. It is there that Corbett extracts his key observations about the asymmetries inherent in accommodation jurisprudence. Continue reading "Antidiscrimination Law Cannot Accommodate Asymmetry"

A Refundable Estate Tax Credit Might Promote Fairness and Reduce Inequality

Jonathan G. Blattmachr, How Wealth Transfer Taxes Might Reduce Racial Wealth Disparity in America, 20 Pitt. Tax Rev. 297 (2023).

Jonathan G. Blattmachr writes, “This Article primarily will deal with how the wealth transfer tax system might be used to provide reparations for descendants of people enslaved in the United States as part of the system of chattel slavery. It will not discuss other potential reparations such as for Native Americans among others.” (P. 297, dagger note.) The term “wealth transfer tax system” refers to the estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes imposed by Subtitle B of Title 26 of the United States Code. (P. 297, note 1.) Blattmachr’s specific proposal is that “a refundable estate tax credit (perhaps, up to a certain limit of wealth or using a scaled credit) could be allowed for the estates of descendants of enslaved persons.” (P. 309.) Blattmachr contributes to the literature of wealth transfer taxes, wealth inequality, racial wealth disparity, and reparations with his thoughtful proposal.

The core of Blattmachr’s proposal is the “refundable estate tax credit.” For any decedent dying in 2024, the estate tax credit currently stands at $5,389,800. (This jot focuses on the estate tax credit of $5,389,800 because Blattmachr’s article focuses on the estate tax credit—often, discussion centers on the estate tax exemption amount ($13,610,000 for a decedent dying in 2024), which is, generally, the amount that can be transferred estate tax-free to persons other than one’s spouse and other than to charities.) That relatively high estate tax credit is slated to sunset at the end of 2025 and revert to a lower estate tax credit unless Congress enacts new legislation. Before we discuss the mechanics and merits of a refundable estate tax credit, we should note that Blattmachr does not propose unequivocally that $5,389,800 be refunded to each estate of descendants of enslaved persons. Instead, Blattmachr explains that the amount of the refundable credit could be limited or scaled. (P. 309.) Continue reading "A Refundable Estate Tax Credit Might Promote Fairness and Reduce Inequality"

The Return of Private Law

Yotam Kaplan, Adi Libson, & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Renaissance of Private Law, 19 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1427 (2025).

Recent events offer a grim picture of the future of public law. In particular, President Trump’s assault on the administrative state seems destined to hamper the ability of agencies to protect the public in familiar areas such as drug safety, auto safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection.

It is for this reason that a recent paper by Yotam Kaplan, Adi Libson, and Gideon Parchomovsky, entitled The Renaissance of Private Law, is especially timely. Their thesis is that private law can partially substitute for some of the functions performed by public law, namely the regulation, supervision, and sanctioning of private actors—especially large corporations which typically escape control by the state, and, even when they do not, ignore civil fines and penalties. Continue reading "The Return of Private Law"

Products Liability as the Pragmatic First Step to A.I. Regulation

Catherine Sharkey, A Products Liability Framework for AI, 25 Columb. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 240 (2024).

With her recent article, A Products Liability Framework for A.I., Professor Catherine Sharkey may have silenced at least some critics of artificial intelligence (A.I.) regulation. At the very least, the article stands as a sharp retort to anti-regulation advocates who often crow: “But how can we regulate A.I. when we don’t even yet know the full extent of what it can do or how it will be used?” Sharkey’s proposed regulatory framework, which eschews ex-ante pre-approval strategies in favor of post-market regulatory monitoring, may just be the answer to one of the critics’ favorite regulatory dodge.

Sharkey has the savoir faire to be afforded credence for any A.I. regulation proposal. As both an A.I./ML (machine learning) law and tort law scholar, what most stands out about Sharkey’s oeuvre is that she has gained enviable access to observe how A.I./ML systems are deployed in the government and has deployed her admirable analytical skills in dissecting those workings. For example, in Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies, Sharkey (along with other scholars), conducted a rigorous canvass of A.I. use at 142 federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies. Sharkey et al’s work in Government by Algorithm has been an inspiration for other scholars taking up the mantle to advocate for guardrails to automated governance. Continue reading "Products Liability as the Pragmatic First Step to A.I. Regulation"

A Thinking Person’s Guide to Tax Conflict at the UN

Frederik Heitmüller, Scenarios for Negotiating a UN Framework Convention on International Tax, ICTD Working Paper 218 (January 2025).

Regardless of one’s normative perspective, international tax—both its design and its substance—is in great flux. We see this playing out at the United Nations in ongoing debates and maneuvers regarding the UN’s new role in global tax policy making, including during the first week of February 2025, as the UN debated a new framework convention process. Of course, the debate is not just about the UN but rather about the system of global taxation itself, and this debate takes place against a broader backdrop of political and economic history and current tensions beyond tax law. Where global tax policy will land in the medium term, and how much it will change, is not clear. The Global South and the Global North have articulated different visions for where tax policy negotiations should occur (UN, OECD, or other), how those negotiations should be conducted, and what substantive topics should be tackled first.

Frederik Heitmüller’s timely ICTD working paper, Scenarios for Negotiating a UN Framework Convention on International Tax, provides readers a fantastic insight into this unsettled world with an accessible yet sophisticated take on the underlying dynamics. In the face of such momentous uncertainty, with great tax, fiscal and political relevance, governments, taxpayers, researchers, business organizations, media, NGOs, and other actors are all trying to interpret, anticipate, and predict how these dynamics will play out. Not surprisingly, there is a substantial flow of commentary, interpretation, and analysis. (My own co-author and I have contributed to this deluge of material.) But Heitmüller’s January 2025 paper broke through the noise for me. I found it a valuable framing of the players, issues, tensions, and options that was both nuanced and informative. The paper opens a window onto what has occurred, and how to map the future. Continue reading "A Thinking Person’s Guide to Tax Conflict at the UN"

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