A Constitutional Reckoning for Workers’ Compensation

Michael C. Duff, Reverberations of Magna Carta: Work Injuries, Inkblots, and Restitution, __ Ne. L. Rev. __ (2025), available at SSRN (Sept. 17, 2024).

I really like articles that take big swings. When I read a good one, and Michael C. Duff’s Reverberations of Magna Carta falls into that category, it teaches me something, reveals assumptions that I didn’t know I held, and points the way to new ways of thinking. Reverberations takes as its starting point the fact that state workers’ compensation systems are covering a dwindling share of the costs of work-related illness and injuries. A U.S. Department of Labor study puts the percentage at only 21%, while workers themselves, their families, private insurance, and taxpayer-funded Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security programs are covering the rest. Duff casts this remedial deprivation as a constitutional problem.

Duff roots his argument in the original “Grand Bargain” that produced the workers’ compensation system, where workers give up their right to sue in tort in exchange for a workers’ compensation remedy. He contends that states’ chipping away of workers’ compensation protection through caps, time-limits, and procedural barriers effectively strips workers of the remedies they are due in exchange for the common law rights they relinquished. In Duff’s view, those common law rights are protected from state interference under the Ninth Amendment, which recognizes unenumerated rights “retained by the people,” and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which safeguards the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” against state interference. Continue reading "A Constitutional Reckoning for Workers’ Compensation"

Evaluating Standards for Making Fiduciary Decisions

James Toomey, Fiduciary Standards, 51 ACTEC L.J. (forthcoming 2026), available at SSRN (Apr. 8, 2025).

Professor James Toomey analyzes fiduciary principles by comparing two standards, “best interests” and “substituted judgment.” As defined by Toomey, a fiduciary makes a decision in the principal’s best interest when the fiduciary objectively assesses the circumstances. On the other hand, substituted judgment considers the principal’s subjective intent, and thus asks the fiduciary to make the decision the principal would have wanted under the circumstances. Toomey evaluates both models by considering various applications of fiduciary law and assessing whether either standard adequately articulates the legal obligations imposed on fiduciaries.

To demonstrate the difference between the fiduciary standards, Professor Toomey describes how fiduciary decisions based on substituted judgment focus on probable intent and personal identity of the principal. Alternatively, fiduciary decisions based on best interests do not focus on personal identity, but instead reflect the ideal, efficient choices based on the circumstances. Further, he discusses situations where fiduciaries have blended these two standards. Continue reading "Evaluating Standards for Making Fiduciary Decisions"

Price and Prejudice

Tom Baker, What Is Insurance for Tort Law?, 111 Va. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2025), available at SSRN.

It is a truth rarely acknowledged by tort theorists that personal injury lawyers in possession of good plaintiffs must also be in want of insured defendants. Tom Baker acknowledges that truth in What is Insurance for Tort Law?, and follows it to some bracing conclusions. Baker’s article is a welcome rejoinder to Kenneth Abraham and Catherine Sharkey’s recent call to treat insurance as a constitutive part of tort doctrine and practice.1 Abraham and Sharkey embrace liability insurance as an economically “beneficial” aspect of tort practice that “spreads the risk of tort liability, []helps to promote safety, ensures compensation for some tort victims who would otherwise not be compensated, and enables planning and budgeting . . . by potential defendants.”2 Not so fast, Baker warns. When an insurance eminence like Baker issues a warning, it’s a good idea to listen. Yes, he agrees, tort and insurance are in the symbiotic business of distributing compensation. But Baker argues that tort should aspire to non-economic goals like corrective justice, and then artfully demonstrates how yoking injury outcomes to insurance pricing mechanisms can hobble that goal.

Baker begins with a frank and comprehensive look at how liability insurance influences tort in action. Because insurance “provides the money that changes hands through tort claiming,” (P. 8) lawyers who earn contingency fees are reluctant to sue uninsured defendants and insured defendants typically cede control over litigation to insurers. And because the universe of tort cases is determined by the infrastructure of insurance, tort doctrine has developed in ways that reflect and amplify the interests of insurers. For example, insurers who manage large pools of litigation are positioned to cherry-pick cases as vehicles for friendly changes to procedural and doctrinal rules. (Pp. 12-15.) Further, by tracing verdicts back to centralized insurers rather than to decentralized defendants, lobbyists can depict plaintiff compensation as an “insurance crisis” that justifies anti-plaintiff legislative reforms like damage caps, the restriction of joint and several liability, and limits to the collateral source rule. (Pp. 17-18.) Most notably, plaintiffs lawyers fill their rosters with clients whose claims can “plead into” existing insurance. Consequently, they prioritize cases involving premises liability, bodily injury, and property damage and devalue cases involving pure emotional or economic loss. (P. 15.) Continue reading "Price and Prejudice"

Distinguishing Marks

Dustin Marlan, Servicing Trade Dress: Demystifying the Tertium Quid, 58 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1513 (2025).

It is rare in legal scholarship to be both novel and clearly correct at the same time. In Servicing Trade Dress: Demystifying the Tertium Quid, Professor Marlan pulls it off. He starts with a puzzling carveout in a key Supreme Court case in 2000, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. That case drew a significant line between product packaging (which is eligible for immediate trademark protection if it is “inherently distinctive”—that is, if the court thinks that consumers would immediately recognize it as indicating the source of a product, not just product descriptions or decorations) and product design (which may only be protected by trademark law if it has gained “secondary meaning” by recognition in the marketplace over time). Product design isn’t as likely to signal source to consumers as words are, the Court reasoned, and, separately, it’s also very likely to provide non-source-related benefits. Most of the time, a cigar is just a cigar. Thus, trademark protection should be given sparingly, only when the claimant proves that the claimed design is actually serving a source-identifying function.

Wal-Mart’s rule makes it harder to bring anticompetitive lawsuits against competitors based on product design—the burden will be on the claimant both to prove that its claimed design is nonfunctional and also to prove that consumers are likely to perceive it as an indicator of source. This is particularly useful because competitors are likely to want to use similar product designs, not to confuse consumers, but to provide consumers with the same benefits. Continue reading "Distinguishing Marks"

Relics Reevaluated: How to think about Tariffs in a World Dominated by the Income Tax

Reuven Avi-Yonah, Doron Norotzki, & Tamir Shana, From Relic to Relevance, The Resurgence of Tariffs, 77 U. Cal. L. J. __ (forthcoming, 2026), available at SSRN (Mar. 10, 2025).

There’s a lot of confusion about the justifications for and the consequences of tariffs in the news these days. The essay by Reuven Avi-Yonah, Doron Norotzki, and Tamir Shana entitled From Relic to Relevance, The Resurgence of Tariffs, attempts to remedy the situation. Its bottom-line conclusion is that it is extremely difficult to imagine a tariff system sufficiently robust to raise revenue adequate to replace the income tax even if revenue were the only concern. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to implement such a tariff without the real possibility of wreaking havoc on both domestic and international economies. The authors of Relic to Relevance (hereinafter “Relic authors”) want us all to understand why reliance on tariffs, especially as a replacement for the income tax, could be so dangerous.

As the Relic authors outline, introducing major changes in tax instruments is tricky business. In peace time, the United States Congress has rarely made such moves. The first time was the expected result of the adoption of the Constitution; expected because the need for a revenue source controlled by Congress and for uniform trade policy had been primary motivations for adopting a constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation. In its first substantive piece of legislation, Congress enacted the Act for Laying a Duty on Goods. This Act became law on the first Fourth of July celebrated under the new Constitution in 1789 (1 Stat. 24). Continue reading "Relics Reevaluated: How to think about Tariffs in a World Dominated by the Income Tax"

The Case for NIL as Property

Mitchell F. Crusto, What is Property?: A Libertarian Perspective of Name, Image, and Likeness, 16 Harv. J. of Sports & Ent. L. 1 (2025).

In 2020, the Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. Alston rocked college athletics by dismantling the NCAA’s amateurism model. In the wake of Alston, the ability of student-athletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness (NIL) has transformed college sports. Athletes are now recruited for their athletic ability and also viewed as economic actors. While the NCAA has revised its policies to allow for athlete compensation tied to NIL, the broader legal and regulatory terrain remains unstable. It is against this backdrop that Professor Mitchell Crusto’s thought-provoking article, What is Property?: A Libertarian Perspective of Name, Image, and Likeness, offers an important intervention.

A longtime leader in exploring how property law intersects with issues of race, class, and power, Professor Crusto turns his attention to the NIL revolution with great depth. His central claim is that NIL should be understood not as a right of publicity but as a form of property. That conceptual shift, he argues, would more effectively enable student-athletes to realize the economic value of their NIL while offering them stronger protection against exploitation. Continue reading "The Case for NIL as Property"

Two New Windows Into Discovery

About thirty years ago, Paul D. Carrington observed that the discovery stage of civil litigation is a “means of correcting imbalances in … power that are productive of injustice.” Two recent articles—one by Miyoko T. Pettit-Toledo and one by James Stone—illustrate the lasting power of that reflection. While each takes on a different aspect of discovery, both pair thoughtful empirical work with probing critical analyses that get at the very real stakes for litigants. And each, in effect, applies a version of the old test for a person’s character by addressing how various discovery systems treat the most vulnerable amongst us.

Pettit-Toledo’s The Politics of Proportionality in State Civil Rulemaking analyzes state responses to the 2015 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which controversially integrated a proportionality element into the definition of the scope of discovery. Proponents lauded its potential for stemming costly discovery. Critics worried that it would be used to stifle necessary factfinding. But, as Adam Steinman identified, the battle over the amendment ultimately would be fought in its case-by-case application in the lower federal courts. Pettit-Toledo follows a natural corollary flowing from the federal rules’ historical influence on state procedure: how states respond to the rule change also is a significant part of the story. Continue reading "Two New Windows Into Discovery"

Unbroken Tradition” or Broken Chain? Contextualizing Medieval Abortion Law

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court relied on medieval English legal texts to argue that “an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law.”1 In Context Matters, Sara Butler demonstrates that reading medieval texts shorn of their context can be dangerous. Butler shows us not only that the rationales behind abortion laws were different in the Middle Ages, as we might expect, but also that the term “abortion” itself referred to a broader and different set of practices than those encompassed by the word “abortion” in its contemporary usage. Butler argues that, when we put medieval abortion laws in their context, they appear to be something fundamentally different from modern abortion laws. Rather than an unbroken chain, we see two very different types of practices in modern and medieval abortion law.

Butler, whose scholarship has encompassed topics such as forensic medicine in medieval homicide investigations, the history of peine forte et dure, and, indeed, the treatment of abortion in medieval English law, is well positioned to add important context to the texts Justice Alito cites in Dobbs. She surveys writing on abortion over a period of several centuries and a number of different geographic contexts to illuminate the major themes of medieval thought about abortion. And, as Butler observes, the major problem the court faces in trying to trace the history of abortion back to the twelfth or thirteenth century is that in discussing abortion today and abortion in the Middle Ages “we are not comparing like entities.” (P. 22.) Continue reading "Unbroken Tradition” or Broken Chain? Contextualizing Medieval Abortion Law"

Solving our pressing need for more electricity transmission

Joshua Macey & Elias van Emmerick, Towards a National Transmission Planning Authority, 49 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 79 (2025).

America will probably be using a lot more electricity in the very near future. Demand will increase due to data centers for artificial intelligence, as well as electrification that is a central part of decarbonizing the American economy such as continued adoption of electric vehicles and electrification of home heating and cooking. But increased demand for electricity creates a problem. It will require an expansion of our electricity transmission network, a system that was designed for much lower levels of electricity usage. Moreover, the restructuring of electricity markets in much of the US starting in the 1990s is requiring more transmission capacity because of the integration of electricity generation and demand on a much larger scale than in the day when most electricity was generated and used within the service area of a single public utility. Greater extreme weather events because of climate change will increase the demand for electricity and also increase the risk of failures in the transmission system – larger transmission systems can provide resilience for these situations.

But the process for constructing new US transmission systems is broken. The US has built a fraction of the miles of high-voltage transmission lines that are required to meet our future needs. Building on prior work that has helped identify the problem, Joshua Macey and Elias van Emmerick’s article provides two key contributions. First, they show how the current system incentivizes the construction of transmission projects that do not benefit the grid as a whole. Second, through a thorough analysis of the existing powers of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Department of Energy, they identify a range of legal authorities that those agencies could use to address the problems already identified through administrative action – providing a potential roadmap for at least starting to work on our need for more transmission. Continue reading "Solving our pressing need for more electricity transmission"

Rural Institutional Loss

Two recent studies of rural court systems highlight the importance of institutional investment for improving access to justice in rural communities. Rural communities not only need more individual providers, such as lawyers and community justice workers, they also need local nonprofits, community action networks, mental health treatment centers and other institutional infrastructure to support and partner with providers1 including—critically—more public investment in rural county government and courts.

In Legal Deserts and Spatial Injustice: A Study of Criminal Legal Systems in Rural Washington, Lisa R. Pruitt, Jennifer Sherman, and Jennifer Schwartz document alarming institutional deficits in rural county criminal justice systems. Based on detailed qualitative and quantitative data from six rural counties in central and eastern Washington, they find a growing shortage of lawyers available to prosecute and defend criminal cases, with county vacancy rates for defense attorneys of up to 67% (P. 868); an increasing reliance on remote appearances by defense attorneys who never meet their clients (P. 884); and “a lack of services and infrastructure to support system-involved individuals, from drug treatment programs to public transportation.” (P. 852.) Continue reading "Rural Institutional Loss"

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