Legal Theory, Law, and Politics: Making Theory Useful
In his famous 1957 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard, the renowned British legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart presented a vision of law as a system of rules validated through institutional procedures and not dependent on moral merit for their validity. Later that year, his American colleague Lon Fuller countered that only an “inner morality” imbues law with its binding force; normative statements lacking moral merit do not qualify as law. This debate, states Allan C. Hutchinson in Hart, Fuller, and Everything After, defined the agenda of Anglo-American jurisprudence for decades afterward; but, closely bound up with the historical and intellectual conditions of its day, he argues, it offers a poor framework for discussing the diversity of legal practices beyond the postwar liberal societies of Britain and the United States. As an historian of Ottoman law, I’m inclined to agree.
One of the great challenges that historians in fields like mine face is the difficulty of connecting the literature on modern legal theory with the normative worlds of societies far different from the ones that figures like Hart and Fuller addressed. By unpacking the seemingly timeless questions at the center of the Hart–Fuller debate, Hutchinson instead presents law as an ongoing social activity shaped by interpretation, institutional practices, and political and moral struggles. In doing so, he makes legal theory speak to these other worlds, and thereby makes it more useful for a much broader audience. Continue reading "Legal Theory, Law, and Politics: Making Theory Useful"






