Dynamic Inventorship
Inventors and their inventions are the building blocks of patent law: There simply is no patent law without inventors who seek to patent their inventions. One might think that a concept as foundational as inventorship would be both well-settled and extensively argued in legal opinions. But that is not the case. In fact, understanding who counts as an inventor and what constitutes an invention has surprisingly flown below the radar both in patent law scholarship and judicial opinions. In her article, The Inventorship Fallacy, Amy Motomura helps us with a deeply-researched and carefully-parsed analysis of the myriad and often contradictory ways in which courts have defined the “inventor” and the “invention.”
Motomura’s article makes a number of important contributions to the literature. First, it sheds light on the inventorship doctrine’s hidden role in policing the boundaries of related patent filings (what she calls the “indirect” role of inventorship). It then provides a taxonomy for how to think about who counts as an inventor, disaggregating the concept into three strands: manner, timing and substance. Ultimately, her inquiry into how courts define the “substance” of inventorship—that is, what a participant must contribute to become a true inventor—leads her to a second key descriptive contribution: defining who counts as an inventor requires defining what counts as an invention for inventorship purposes. This task, in turn, has no clear doctrinal answer. Rather, the Federal Circuit has implicitly articulated three mutually exclusive understandings of the invention as reflected in (1) the full scope of the claims; (2) only the novel and nonobvious elements of the claims; or (3) only the “not-well-known” or “not publicly accessible” elements of the claims. Continue reading "Dynamic Inventorship"






