Yearly Archives: 2025

“I’m Not a Distortion, You’re a Distortion!”

Rebecca Morrow, The Income Tax as a Market Correction, available at SSRN (March 28, 2025).

The fundamental problem with orthodox economic analysis of policy issues is the lack of a clear baseline. That is, standard economic arguments revolve around moving the world from its currently impure and benighted “inefficient” equilibrium back to its idyllic efficient state (known technically as Pareto efficiency). Yet, as I have discussed here, we do not and cannot know what that perfectly efficient state looks like – or even how we would know it when we achieved it. In turn, that means that we do not know whether any particular legal change or policy intervention will move us closer to or further away from the efficient state of the world. Indeed, we might already be in that supposedly ideal state, which would mean that any changes would move us into a suboptimal world.

Rebecca Morrow’s The Income Tax as a Market Correction uses the inherent unknowability about what is and is not efficient to offer a profound (and also somewhat cheeky) retort to the many economists who call the income tax inefficient. Professor Morrow is right that having an income tax could be more efficient than not having an income tax – because, again, anything is possible in a world without a known baseline – but she goes further and argues that the income tax in the United States probably is more efficient than the alternative. Continue reading "“I’m Not a Distortion, You’re a Distortion!”"

Should Property Law Evolve to Recognize Personal Property Servitudes?

Daniel M. Klerman & Stefan Bechtold, Personal Property Servitudes Revisited, 99 Tulane L. Rev. 345 (2024).

A new work by Professors Daniel Klerman and Stefan Bechtold, Personal Property Servitudes Revisited, is an excellent case study in when and how property rules should and can evolve. Professors Klerman and Bechtold inquire whether those buying and selling personal property (chattels) can write contracts that legally bind purchasers just as those buying and selling real property can use real covenants and equitable servitudes to bind future purchasers.

Equally as important, the authors ask whether buyers and sellers of personal property should be able to write such contracts. The traditional answer has been “no.” For a long time, concerns about notice, tracing, and administrability have limited the recognition and enforcement of servitudes attached to personal property in its transfer. Continue reading "Should Property Law Evolve to Recognize Personal Property Servitudes?"

An End to Arbitration Exceptionalism?

Myriam Gilles, Arbitration Exceptionalism, available at SSRN. (Feb. 27, 2025).

Privatization of traditionally public government functions is all the rage in the second Trump administration. The news is rife with suggestions of privatizing everything from delivering the mail to keeping airplanes aloft to tracking the weather. These developments seem consistent with the Supreme Court’s longtime trends of favoring privatization of their own bread and butter—public adjudication in court. Since 1980, the Court has treated arbitration agreements with special status, pursuing a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” while showcasing a hostility to court litigation. Pro-arbitration policies are popular around the world for commercial contracts. But the Supreme Court’s particular flavor of arbitration favoritism has led to a certain American arbitration exceptionalism—a pro-arbitration policy not just for international commercial contracts and other business-to-business contexts, but for employment and consumer contracts (for which other countries do not countenance arbitration given the imbalance of bargaining power between the parties). Today’s legal environment might lead one to expect Supreme Court support for arbitration and privatization of dispute resolution only to grow.

But Myriam Gilles, who has been tracking and criticizing these trends for a long time, provides some reason for optimism that the Court might reverse course. Gilles’s latest article, Arbitration Exceptionalism, charts the rise and, she suggests, potential coming fall of arbitration exceptionalism, particularly since the Supreme Court’s 2022 opinion in Morgan v. Sundance. Continue reading "An End to Arbitration Exceptionalism?"

The Right to Children’s Future Privacy

In June of 2025, Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. told a legislative committee that his agency would be working towards a goal of every American wearing a device tracking information about the wearer’s body and health within four years.

One assumption underlying RFK Jr.’s campaign is that more information is always helpful – but what if the health information you learn warns of elevated risks that you can do nothing to prevent? Even further, what if you never asked for the information at all? In Poked, Prodded, and Privacy: Parents, Children, and Pediatric Genetic Testing, Allison M. Whelan incisively explores these questions in the context of genetic testing, explaining multiple ways that the privacy rights of children can be violated if their parents consent to genetic testing on their behalf. Professor Whelan’s analysis also illuminates broader dilemmas about the rights of children and authority of parents playing out in multiple troubling ways, including denials of gender affirming care to transgender youth. Continue reading "The Right to Children’s Future Privacy"

What the Hell is the Major Questions Doctrine?

Anita S. Krishnakumar, What the New Major Questions Doctrine Is Not, 92 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1117 (2024).

When the sun sets in New York City, it rises in Tokyo. Okay, maybe not exactly, but you get the idea: setting somewhere, rising somewhere else. Now substitute Chevron for N.Y.C. and the Major Questions Doctrine for Tokyo. For the past forty years, administrative law scholars have been arguing over Chevron, and now that the sun has set on that doctrine, it’s time to turn our attention to the new rising sun, the Major Questions Doctrine (“MQD”). The sudden emergence and prominence of the MQD in administrative law has led scholars to ask just what kind of legal doctrine the MQD is. If the voluminous scholarship on Chevron is any indication, there will be much, much more to come.

Sometimes, to figure out what something is, you first have to figure out what it isn’t. That is what Professor Anita Krishnakumar has helped us do with her excellent article What the New Major Questions Doctrine is Not. In this article, Professor Krishnakumar persuasively argues that neither scholars nor jurists have provided convincing characterizations of the doctrine. After illustrating how all attempts thus far to categorize the MQD have failed, she offers her own tentative characterization, recognizing that a definitive answer is impossible because it’s relatively early in the life of the current MQD and because the Court’s opinions invoking the MQD are somewhat inconsistent and unclear, making a definitive characterization impossible. Remind anyone of Chevron scholarship? Continue reading "What the Hell is the Major Questions Doctrine?"

What the Hell is the Major Questions Doctrine?

Anita S. Krishnakumar, What the New Major Questions Doctrine Is Not, 92 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1117 (2024).

When the sun sets in New York City, it rises in Tokyo. Okay, maybe not exactly, but you get the idea: setting somewhere, rising somewhere else. Now substitute Chevron for N.Y.C. and the Major Questions Doctrine for Tokyo. For the past forty years, administrative law scholars have been arguing over Chevron, and now that the sun has set on that doctrine, it’s time to turn our attention to the new rising sun, the Major Questions Doctrine (“MQD”). The sudden emergence and prominence of the MQD in administrative law has led scholars to ask just what kind of legal doctrine the MQD is. If the voluminous scholarship on Chevron is any indication, there will be much, much more to come.

Sometimes, to figure out what something is, you first have to figure out what it isn’t. That is what Professor Anita Krishnakumar has helped us do with her excellent article What the New Major Questions Doctrine is Not. In this article, Professor Krishnakumar persuasively argues that neither scholars nor jurists have provided convincing characterizations of the doctrine. After illustrating how all attempts thus far to categorize the MQD have failed, she offers her own tentative characterization, recognizing that a definitive answer is impossible because it’s relatively early in the life of the current MQD and because the Court’s opinions invoking the MQD are somewhat inconsistent and unclear, making a definitive characterization impossible. Remind anyone of Chevron scholarship? Continue reading "What the Hell is the Major Questions Doctrine?"

Is Textualism Akin to Letting Judges Look Over a Crowd and Pick Out their Friends?

James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Does Textualism Constrain Supreme Court Justices?, available at SSRN (Feb. 3, 2025).

Textualist jurists and scholars have long contended that their preferred interpretive approach is superior to competing approaches because text-based analysis limits judicial discretion and constrains judges. Indeed, the late Justice Scalia declared in his book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, that a textualist interpretive approach would “narrow the range of acceptable judicial decision-making” and “curb—even reverse—the tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their own policy preferences.”1 Correspondingly, textualists long have criticized legislative history as an illegitimate interpretive tool that “has something for everyone” and “greatly increases the scope” of judicial manipulation of statutory meaning to suit the judge’s ideological preferences.2 To date, these claims have gone largely untested, although several scholars have offered anecdotal evidence suggesting that textualism does not, in fact, constrain judges all that much.3

Enter Professors Brudney and Baum, who marshal an impressive dataset of 660 statutory decisions involving labor and employment law statutes decided between 1969 and 2024 in order to measure empirically how well textualist interpretive tools constrain judicial decision making. The result is an article rich in both empirical and doctrinal analysis of liberal and conservative justices’ use of textual canons, legislative history, and legislative purpose to reach interpretive outcomes consistent (or inconsistent) with their ideological preferences. Because their dataset is so broad—covering 54 terms’ worth of cases—Brudney and Baum are able to document historical changes and draw historical comparisons that other scholars have only been able to gesture at anecdotally. Continue reading "Is Textualism Akin to Letting Judges Look Over a Crowd and Pick Out their Friends?"

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