Nov 3, 2023 Jasminka KalajdzicCourts Law
Howard M. Erichson & Ethan J. Leib,
Class Action Settlements as Contracts?, 102
N.C. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2023), available on
SSRN.
For the traditional civil proceduralist and legal ethicist, much of class action law is fitting a square peg in a round hole. Few of the principles or rules developed in the context of bilateral relationships apply neatly in representative litigation. For example, rules of conduct are ill-suited to the sui generis relationship class attorneys enjoy with the lead plaintiff and with the class. Cy près remedies common in class settlements provide for relief – payment to a non-party – that the underlying substantive law does not authorize. The presence of absent class members complicates the doctrine of standing, while the opt-out system disrupts expectations of basic due process rights. Add to this list the class action settlement. Its unique nature has to date been undertheorized and underexplored, although the features that distinguish class actions from their two-party counterparts are more pronounced at settlement: a deal binds absent class members who had no power to instruct counsel and no say in the deal’s terms. In these circumstances, is a settlement agreement a “contract” and should disputes arising from the settlement be resolved by resort to strict contract law principles?
Howard Erichson and Ethan Leib challenge the prevailing paradigm of the class action settlement as a contract between parties. Their thesis is that a class settlement agreement is a particular sort of contract and a unique kind of court judgment; it requires its own interpretive framework, one that borrows from the law of contracts and the law of judgments. Their distinctive approach respects the role of the certifying court as protector of class members’ interests in a way that blind adherence to settlement-as-contract ignores. Continue reading "Breaching the Contract Paradigm"
Nov 2, 2023 Omri Ben-ShaharContracts
David A. Hoffman and Yonathan A. Arbel,
Generative Interpretation, 99
N.Y.U L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2024); U of Penn L. Sch., Pub. L. Rsch. Paper, available at
SSRN (Aug. 1, 2023).
The plain meaning rule is out of favor with contracts academia. There is so little to say about it, nothing to theorize, and even less to test students about. Plain meaning? It’s such an unintelligent concept. Scriptures, poems, literature, love letters—they all have subtle meanings that can be imagined and read between the lines. Why not contracts?
Luckily, California rescued the contract world from that slight. Its courts rejected the plain meaning rule! We too now have a job to do: speculate about the meaning of contracts. California and Foucault told us that there is no such thing as plain meaning of words, and so the meaning of the contract must be teased out not merely from the text but also from the context of the agreement. The so-called contextualist interpretation approach liberated our profession to develop surgical interpretation tools that advance various conceptions of what-the-parties-must-have-truly-intended. Precontractual conversations, relational norms, the parties’ interests and expectations, what not. So much richness beneath the text. Aside from a few dissenters, the contracts professoriate either ignores or deplores the plain meaning rule.
There is only one problem with this state of the art: it is divorced from the state of the law. American courts, by and large, regularly apply the plain meaning rule to interpret contracts. Words, courts strangely think, have meanings, and when common sense is not sufficient to discover that meaning dictionaries and treatises can help. Continue reading "Towards the End of Normative Interpretation of Contracts"
Nov 1, 2023 Thomas J. McSweeneyLegal History
Lorren Eldridge’s Law and the Medieval Village Community is a call to historians of English law to return to the study of local, community-generated customary law, a type of law that governed the lives of many of England’s people, but that has been pushed to the periphery in favor of the study of the common law. Eldridge presents the medieval village as a space where customary law was generated, a customary law that, while it was informed by the common law made in the king’s courts, differed from it in important respects.
Law and the Medieval Village Community is as much about the historiography of the village community as it is about its history, and Eldridge has a knack for making historical debate exciting and relevant. She tells the story of how scholars of English law, who once saw the village community as central to the history of English law (and indeed to contemporary legal theory), turned away from the village in the early twentieth century in favor of the records of the central royal courts. This shift proved enduring and has yielded a distorted picture of English law, generating a historiography that focuses on elite spaces and elite litigation to the exclusion of the law that was used and created in local communities. Continue reading "Looking Beyond the Common Law"
