Monthly Archives: June 2022
Jun 6, 2022 Melissa MortazaviLegal Profession
In today’s political climate, railing against the intellectual (not economic) elite has reached an anti-expertise fever pitch. It might be tempting in this climate to dismiss Benjamin Barton’s forthcoming book, The Credentialed Court: Inside the Cloistered Elite World of American Justice, as just another such diatribe. It is not. Instead, Barton’s book proves what scholars have long intuited: that while the Supreme Court facially appears more diverse than in the past, in other ways the court has rarely been so homogenous. Plus, it is such a juicy and delightful read you won’t feel like you’re reading for work.
Ben Barton’s book is a combination of straightforward data and entertaining storytelling. The first few chapters are a delicious highlights reel of the early Supreme Court appointees, full of colorful detail and choice tidbits—from a pro-football player to the story of a self-made immigrant who rocked the constitutional convention, won George Washington’s trust, and married into a prominent family – why it’s the stuff musicals are made of (hint: it’s not Alexander Hamilton)! Barton presents all this to argue that past Supreme Court Justices weren’t uniformly studious or bookish but zany, original, and more accomplished in other fields. Continue reading "Homogenous Diversity"
Jun 6, 2022 Melissa MortazaviLegal Profession
In today’s political climate, railing against the intellectual (not economic) elite has reached an anti-expertise fever pitch. It might be tempting in this climate to dismiss Benjamin Barton’s forthcoming book, The Credentialed Court: Inside the Cloistered Elite World of American Justice, as just another such diatribe. It is not. Instead, Barton’s book proves what scholars have long intuited: that while the Supreme Court facially appears more diverse than in the past, in other ways the court has rarely been so homogenous. Plus, it is such a juicy and delightful read you won’t feel like you’re reading for work.
Ben Barton’s book is a combination of straightforward data and entertaining storytelling. The first few chapters are a delicious highlights reel of the early Supreme Court appointees, full of colorful detail and choice tidbits—from a pro-football player to the story of a self-made immigrant who rocked the constitutional convention, won George Washington’s trust, and married into a prominent family – why it’s the stuff musicals are made of (hint: it’s not Alexander Hamilton)! Barton presents all this to argue that past Supreme Court Justices weren’t uniformly studious or bookish but zany, original, and more accomplished in other fields. Continue reading "Homogenous Diversity"
Jun 3, 2022 Kristina NiedringhausLexLibrarianship and Legal Technology
Law students and attorneys often wonder if it matters whether they use United States Code Service (USCS), a Matthew Bender publication also available on Lexis+, or United States Code Annotated (USCA), a Thomson Reuters publication also available on Westlaw Edge. In 1L legal research classes, I often field the question about what the differences are between the publications. “They are both the US Code, right?” is a common refrain. The traditional lore, passed on to law students, was that USCA strove to provide an annotation for every relevant case while USCS strove to provide annotations to the “best” cases. Accordingly, USCA was said to contain a greater number of annotations and USCS was more selective. I recall being taught this in law school. However, like much folklore, the foundations for this assertion are becoming lost with time and it is unclear whether this represents the current state of the two annotated codes. The product page for the print edition of USCA states that the set has “comprehensive case annotations.” Similarly, the product page for the print version of the USCS states that it is “the most comprehensive” set. We are left to determine for ourselves the meaning of “comprehensive.” We will talk more about this later, but it is important to note that USCS case annotations include administrative decisions while USCA case annotations do not.
Ms. Marcum’s research explores whether there is a significant difference between the annotations found in USCA and USCS. Does it matter which annotated code the researcher uses? Should a thorough researcher use both? Most people would expect some unique case annotations in each annotated code with a fair amount of overlap between the two sets. The surprising results were that out of 9164 case annotations for 23 statutes, 6748 of the annotations were unique to either USCS or USCA. Of the 9164 case annotations, 73.6% of them were unique and only listed in one of the annotated codes. Most researchers will be shocked by the small amount of overlap between the two publications. One could anticipate that this percentage would be statistically significant, and Ms. Marcum confirms this is true using a Wilcoxon T test. Continue reading "Checking Annotations in both USCS and USCA: Necessary or Redundant?"
Jun 2, 2022 Andrew HalpinJurisprudence
Often an article or essay proves valuable for the points it directly advances in promoting the author’s view on the subject matter it covers. Sometimes, additional value is produced because the piece indirectly stimulates fresh thinking on that subject matter, irrespective of whether following those novel lines of thought proves to be compatible with or at variance with the author’s own viewpoint. In these terms, Kevin Toh’s essay on Legal Positivism and Meta-Ethics in The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism provides double value.
Toh is directly concerned to raise a number of important points related to the different levels legal theory operates on, and how an appreciation of meta-ethics might inform our understanding of the relationships between these levels and the fruit that might yield. Meta-ethics may assist both by analogy (P. 566), and by contributing its own perspective on an appropriate delineation of morals so as to inform legal theory’s own preoccupation with the law/morality connection or divide (P. 570). That latter contribution is expanded by Toh into an endorsement of wider philosophical collaboration between different disciplines. And it is this use of “resources made available by other areas of philosophy and related empirical disciplines” (P. 570) that shapes Toh’s own tentative contribution to understanding the nature of law. (P. 581.) Continue reading "Taking Control With Meta"
Jun 1, 2022 Lyrissa B. LidskyConstitutional Law
In the past few years, a number of prominent voices—including then-candidate Donald Trump, Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Neil Gorsuch, federal appeals court judge Lawrence Silberman, top Democratic election lawyer Marc Elias, and others—have called for the Supreme Court to reconsider its constitutionalization of defamation law that began with New York Times v. Sullivan. At first these voices seemed quixotic. But there is a growing debate among legal analysts about whether the constitutional parameters of defamation should be altered to strike a better balance between society’s interests in protecting individual reputation, safeguarding freedom of expression, and anchoring our public discourse in truth. Christina Tilley’s new article, (Re)Categorizing Defamation, enters this debate firmly on the side of tilting the playing field back toward plaintiffs, in the expectation that doing so will also help restore media credibility and provide United States citizens with the factual information we need to engage in democratic self-governance.
Although she expresses her prescription somewhat tentatively as merely a call for “reconsideration” of existing law, Tilley urges that defamation law should abandon fault-based liability in favor of a default regime of strict liability. Her rationales for this revolutionary call to return to the defamation law regime that existed prior to 1964 hinge crucially on her accounts of the role of agency in tort law, and the diminished level of “control” mainstream media have (or choose to exert) over their news product today. As she writes, “As publishers have ceded control over content production to in-house bot journalists and independent, amateur reporters, and have ceded control over content publication to platform algorithms, they no longer exercise the kind of control that justifies the use of a fault-based liability standard.” (P. 516.) Continue reading "Defamation Law Reform: A Tort Remedy for Ultrahazardous Words?"
