Monthly Archives: July 2014
These days, I think a lot about police torture.
To be more precise, these days I am wrestling with problems of how to “prove” police torture occurred. And that’s why I recently read Kim D. Chanbonpin’s article “Truth Stories: Credibility Determinations at the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission.”
The question at the heart of the problem I am struggling with is straightforward enough: How can one evaluate a claim of police torture when the only source of the claim is the alleged victim and when the police and prosecutors categorically deny that anything occurred? Continue reading "Patterns and Practices"
This is a provocative and important essay that has implications Solum doesn’t spell out for some positions on meaning, communication, statutory interpretation, and the understanding—sometimes called the “construction”—of statutory texts. Solum is interested in communicative content, principally of directives. Most of his examples are of legal directives, or as he prefers to describe them, legal rules.
Solum begins with an important distinction between communicative content, the kind of meaning he is interested in discussing, and legal meaning, the legal contribution a text makes in its particular legal system. It is not uncommon for discussion of statutory interpretation to conflate the two or to focus entirely on the latter, but this is a mistake. In some legal systems, such as in the United States, the communicative content of a statute can cause it to fail to make any legal contribution (because, for example, the statute is unconstitutional). So getting clear on communicative content is a prolegomena to getting clear on much of statutory interpretation. Solum aims to make a significant contribution to this task by illuminating the lack of connection between communicative content, intention, and the mental states of individual legislators. Continue reading "Meaning, Intention, and Mental States"
Empirical studies of creative communities continue to provide scholars and policymakers with useful evidence for assessing intellectual property regimes. In Seven Commandments, we find yet another excellent example of the type of evidence we need to know and, perhaps even more importantly, robust methods for gathering it.
The article reports on a study of Threadless, an online community that crowd-sources t-shirt designs. As with many such communities, it uses a combination of collaborative and competitive elements, allowing users to work together on certain projects while also competing with each other for approval, funding, and ultimately production and distribution of the designed apparel. The authors of the paper seek to study the IP norms of the Threadless community in order to understand what makes it succeed in terms of incentives to create. In particular, they note that because formal enforcement of copyright law is generally difficult if not impossible on such sites, normative systems are presumed to play the major role in protecting the investment of creators. Continue reading "From Crowd-Sourcing to Crowd-Enforcing: An Empirical analysis of Threadless’s Community IP Norms"
Relationship recognition has been at the center of reform efforts in family law for the last two decades. Scholars and advocates alike have focused intently on the need to provide recognition and support for a variety of relationships that the law has traditionally ignored. These include the relationships of not only same-sex couples, but also of cohabiting couples, nonmonogamous groupings, and friends. The reform proposals have assumed that legal recognition brings with it economic benefits.
In a fascinating new article, Erez Aloni questions this assumption by highlighting the interplay between two considerations: first, it is sometimes the case that nonrecognition of relationships can have financial benefits for their members; second, the state sometimes recognizes relationships in the absence of a request by either party—what Aloni labels “purely ascriptive recognition”—for the limited purpose of determining eligibility for particular benefits. In most cases of purely ascriptive recognition, if the combined income exceeds a certain amount, then the individuals become ineligible for the benefit in question. When the two considerations are brought together, we are left with forms of legal recognition that cause financial harm. Continue reading "Recognition Without Consent"
Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security After the Affordable Care Act
, N.C.L. Rev.
(forthcoming), available at SSRN
Too often, discussions about health insurance coverage are one-dimensional, and focus solely on whether someone has coverage (good) or not (bad). Having health insurance coverage is undeniably a good thing and an important policy goal. However, as Professor Hoffman’s article points out, simply focusing on health insurance coverage, without examining the type of protection it provides, gives us an incomplete picture of an individual’s protection against health-related financial risks.
One of the primary goals of health insurance, after all, is to protect individuals from the financial insecurity that can result from medical spending. What is perhaps less obvious to the casual observer is that health insurance can provide very different levels of protection against financial insecurity depending on the plan’s premiums, cost-sharing structure, and coverage terms. In her article, Professor Hoffman first provides a taxonomy of the types of financial risk health insurance could attempt to reduce. She then uses stylized examples of three health insurance consumers to examine how various forms of post-ACA coverage provide financial security. Her examination leads to some surprising results. Continue reading "Getting Specific About the Financial Security Aspects of Health Insurance"
PHP 5.4 and beta wordpress version 4.0-beta2-20140722
The post Updated & Tested Also appeared first on Jotwell: Zetasec2. Continue reading "Updated & Tested Also"
PHP 5.4 and beta wordpress version 4.0-beta2-20140722
Running PHP 5.4
Kelly A. Behre, Digging Beneath the Equality Language: The Influence of the Fathers’ Rights Movement on Intimate Partner Violence Public Policy Debates and Family Law Reform,
21 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L.
(forthcoming 2014), available at SSRN
The fathers’ rights movement relies on the rhetoric of equality. Men, it seems, are discriminated against because the law has come under the sway of feminists. Feminists have prevailed upon the law to intrude in areas where the government has no business, such as the home. Moreover, feminists have convinced policy makers that there is an epidemic of domestic violence perpetrated by men upon women and that adult intimate partner violence should be considered in issues of custody of children. The correct view according to the fathers’ rights movement, is that true equality means gender-neutrality.
While discussions, critiques, and analysis of the equality rhetoric of the international fathers’ rights movements are not novel, Kelly Behre’s article, Digging Beneath the Equality Language: The Influence of the Fathers’ Rights Movement on Intimate Partner Violence Public Policy Debates and Family Law Reform, does – – – as the title promises – – – “dig beneath.” The article’s first section is an excellent overview of the equality narratives of the fathers’ rights movement, including the appeal to civil rights movements and the use of both discrimination and gender-neutral tropes. But the real contribution of Behre’s article is her exploration of the relationship between empiricism and equality. Continue reading "Empiricism and Equality: Studying Fathers’ Rights"
Angela Daly, E-Book Monopolies and the Law
, 18 Media & Arts L. Rev. 350 (2013), available at SSRN
It’s still fashionable to point to the “cloud” as the solution to all sorts of problems in technology. But can such a shift disturb the carefully worked out compromises between different interests, which are embedded in legislation on topics such as competition and intellectual property?
Angela Daly, a research fellow at the Swinburne Institute of Technology (Australia) who is also about to complete a doctorate at the European University Institute (Florence, Italy), suggests that these clouds may bring little but rain. In her article, “E-book monopolies and the law”, published in the consistently topical Melbourne-based Media and Arts Law Review, she considers two particular features of e-book platforms and content: digital rights management, and competition. Continue reading "Don’t Restrict My E-book"
One of the most frequently asked questions of criminal defense lawyers is some variation of “How can you represent someone you know is guilty?” Law students ask this question often as they explore vicariously the possibility of representing the criminally accused. I respond carefully. I try to take them back to my own experience and the immense pride (and yes, sometimes trepidation) I felt in assisting some of the most powerless and forgotten members of our society. I tell them the truth. The hardest cases were not those in which I thought that my client was guilty. Hardest were those cases in which I believed or suspected that my client was innocent. Those are the cases over which I lost the most sleep and worried that my own limitations and competencies as a lawyer would unfairly determine my client’s liberty. I worked tirelessly for acquittals in those cases (and others) but recall to this day that even acquittals could not make innocent criminal defendants “whole.” Acquittals were viewed by defense and prosecution attorneys alike as lucky windfalls. The acquitted defendant somehow evaded the “true verdict” of guilt. Rarely could acquitted defendants return to their former lives without the stain of having been accused. In other words, a defendant who was found “not guilty” was perceived as not entirely “innocent” either.
A close examination of verdicts of acquittal has been long overdue. This is precisely what Daniel Givelber and Amy Farrell bring to us in their new book Not Guilty: Are the Acquitted Innocent? In particular, they study the relationship between the acquittals and actual innocence. They begin with the notion that acquittals, like comedian Rodney Dangerfield, “get no respect.” Practitioners, scholars and the general public tend to assume that acquittals are based on misinformed or nullifying jurors or systemic failures allowing the guilty to go free. The authors observe that the law itself harbors a similar bias insofar as evidence of prior acquittals can be admitted in the adjudication of a new offense or to enhance a sentence in a new offense. Givelber and Farrell acknowledge that they can’t directly disprove these assumptions. (For instance how do we know whether an acquitting jury has nullified or genuinely believes that the defendant is not guilty of the charge?). Instead they analyze data from four hundred trials to determine how and whether the evidence in acquitted cases differs from or resembles the evidence in conviction cases. Continue reading "What Can Be Learned From the Wrongfully Accused?"